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1 Introduction
In many countries, the central government pays discretionary transfers to fiscally distressed
subnational jurisdictions. Examples include Germany where the federal government has
provided special transfers to two indebted states in the early nineties (Seitz, 1999), Italy
where chronically unstable regional public health systems regularly receive ex-post financing
from the center (Bordignon and Turati, 2009), and Sweden where the central government
often grants additional funding to indebted municipalities (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2010). Such
transfers, usually referred to as bailouts, can be very costly. First, there are direct costs. The
bailout of the two states in Germany, for example, cost around 15 billion Euro over a period
of ten years. More importantly, however, bailouts may distort the behavior of subnational
governments and thus carry large indirect costs. In particular, subnational governments have
an incentive to over-borrow if the central government responds to subnational borrowing with
a bailout (Rodden et al., 2003). For example, Pettersson-Lidbom (2010) estimates that in
Sweden bailout expectations are responsible for an increase in municipal debt by more than
20%.1
If bailouts cause inefficient subnational borrowing, why do central governments not simply
implement a no-bailout policy? Without the possibility of additional transfers, the incentives
of subnational governments should remain undistorted and their borrowing should be effi-
cient. The usual answer is that a no-bailout policy involves a dynamic commitment problem
(Kornai, 1979). Once a subnational government faces a fiscal crisis, it might be in the inter-
est of the central government to grant it additional resources. If subnational governments
are aware of this possibility, they will continue to harbor bailout expectations even if the
central government announces a no-bailout policy ex-ante.
1Baskaran and Hessami (2012) even suggest that bailout expectations might have been partially respon-
sible for the recent debt crises in several EU countries.
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One reason why central governments might find it difficult to follow through with a no-
bailout policy are electoral considerations. A central government that is concerned with its
reelection might face strong incentives to grant bailouts to a subnational jurisdiction if it
believes that such additional resources will increase the number of votes it can gain in that
jurisdiction. For this explanation for the persistence of subnational bailout expectations to
be valid, however, it must be the case that voters in jurisdictions that received a bailout in
the previous legislative period reward the central government in the next election.
I study in this paper whether bailouts carry electoral benefits for the central government
using a panel of 421 municipalities in the German state of Hesse over the period 1999-2011.
During this period, the Hessian state government provided bailouts to almost ten percent
of its municipalities. Simultaneously, two state and three local elections were held. Hessian
municipalities hence provide a compelling institutional laboratory to study the electoral
consequences of subnational bailouts.
My methodology involves estimating models that relate municipal bailouts in the previous
legislative period to the change in the municipal-level vote/seat share of the incumbent
parties in the next state and local elections. To identify the causal effect of bailouts on
the incumbent parties’ vote/seat share, I rely on a selection on observables approach. More
specifically, I treat the allocation of bailouts as quasi-random conditional on legislative term
fixed effects and time-varying control variables. This approach would be invalid if there are
omitted variables that systematically influence both the likelihood of a municipality receiving
a bailout and its propensity to vote for the governing parties at the next election. I argue
further below that the estimates are likely to be robust to such an omitted variable bias.
In a first step, I relate bailouts paid during the 1999-2002 and 2003-2007 state-level legisla-
tive periods to the municipal-level vote share of the governing parties in the state elections
of 2003 and 2008, respectively. If voters reward the state government for bailouts, we should
observe that bailouts are positively related to the subsequent municipal-level vote share of
3
the parties that formed the state government in the previous legislative period. The es-
timates, however, indicate that bailouts have no effect on the vote share of the governing
parties in Hesse. These zero-effects are precisely estimated, which points to an economically
rather than only statistically insignificant effect of bailouts.
In a second step, I investigate whether the ruling parties at the state level benefit at local
rather than state elections from providing a bailout. That is, I relate bailouts in the last
local legislative period (1999-20002, 2001-2005, 2006-2010) to electoral outcomes in the local
elections held in 2001, 2006, and 2011, respectively. The results suggest that the share of
seats in the local council won by the parties forming the state government increases if a
municipality received a bailout in the second half of last local legislative period.
There are two explanations for why the ruling parties benefit at the local but not at the
state level. Voters might either believe that politicians from the local branches of the ruling
party were instrumental in convincing the state government to grant their municipality a
bailout. Consequently, they may feel more grateful to the local rather than the state-level
politicians. Alternatively, voters might believe that voting for the ruling parties in local
rather than in state elections is a more effective way to express their gratitude. That is,
changes in voting patterns within individual municipalities in response to a bailout have
negligible effects on state election outcomes. In local elections, on the other hand, a change
in individual voting patterns can have a significant impact. I explore in a final step which
of these two explanations is valid by studying whether the effect of bailouts on municipal
election outcomes varies according to the ideological composition of the municipal council.
The findings of this paper have interesting implications for future theoretical work on
bailout transfers. That state-level politicians do not benefit from the bailouts they provide
2While the legislative period before the election in 2001 did last from 1997-2000, I only consider bailouts
paid from 1999 onwards because the ideology of the state government changed after the state election of
1999. When voting at the local election in 2001, therefore, voters should associate bailouts before 1999
not with the incumbent state government but rather with the opposition parties, i. e. the parties that had
formed the state government before 1999.
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contradicts several theoretical contributions in political economics that perceive the central
government as opportunistic with respect to its transfer policy (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987;
Dixit and Londregan, 1998; Goodspeed, 2002; Robinson and Torvik, 2009; Kaiser and Tau-
gourdeau, 2012). While I find that the ruling parties benefit from bailouts in subsequent local
elections, it is unclear to what extent state-level politicians will tailor their bailout policy in
anticipation of such electoral outcomes. The primary concern of state-level politicians should
be their reelection in the next state elections. If bailouts do not help in this pursuit, then
state governments should have few incentives to allocate them in view of political consider-
ations. It is consequently likely that they choose to allocate bailouts according to true fiscal
need. On balance, therefore, the results in this paper support the theoretical approaches
which assume that the central government behaves as a welfare-maximizer when it comes
to subnational bailouts (Wildasin, 1997; Inman, 2001; Doi and Ihori, 2006; Akai and Sato,
2008; Crivelli and Staal, 2008; Breuille´ and Vigneault, 2010; Goodspeed and Haughwout,
2012).
This paper contributes to the literature on fiscal federalism by focusing on the central
government’s role in the bailout game. While the behavior of subnational governments that
harbor bailout expectations is well understood (Rodden et al., 2003; Bordignon and Turati,
2009; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2010; Baskaran, 2012a), little is known about the incentives that
central governments face. In particular, there are no studies that explore whether central
governments benefit electorally by providing bailout transfers. Most existing contributions
on the central government’s bailout policy, in contrast, focus on its political determinants
rather than its consequences. For example, Sorribas-Navarro (2011) finds that the Spanish
central government is more likely to provide bailouts to regions with a large number of swing
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voters.3 Whether bailout transfers translate into more votes for the central government,
however, remains unexplored.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the
administrative structure of Hesse, provides a brief description of Hessian local politics, and
discusses the municipal bailouts during the sample period. Section 3 introduces the empirical
methodology to estimate the causal effect of bailouts on electoral gains. Section 4 collects
the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Political developments and fiscal institutions in Hesse
Hesse is located in the center of the German Federation. It has about six million inhabitants
who live in 426 municipalities. 421 municipalities are organized into twenty one counties.
Five large municipalities have a special status and are expected to assume both municipal
and county responsibilities: they are called county-independent cities. I exclude these special
status municipalities from the subsequent analysis since they are not fully comparable to the
remaining 421 regular municipalities. In addition, Hesse has four forest areas. I exclude
these areas from the analysis as well since they have no inhabitants.
Municipalities offer their inhabitants a broad array of goods and services. These goods
and services can be classified according to whether their provision is mandatory or voluntary.
Municipalities are required by law to provide mandatory goods. For example, all munici-
palities must provide primary schooling, municipal daycare services, and civil protection.
3A related literature studies whether the regional allocation of general intergovernmental transfers can be
explained by political variables. Arulampalam et al. (2009) show that political alignment and the existence of
swing voters is important for the amount of transfers that Indian regions receive from the central government.
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), Johansson (2003) and Brollo and Nannicini (2012) obtain similar results by
studying discretionary grants paid by the Swedish and Brazilian central governments to their municipalities,
respectively. A limited number of papers study whether local incumbents benefit in municipal elections
from general transfers (Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Litschig and Morrision, 2009). The electoral
consequences of general federal transfers for incumbent representatives in US House elections have been
explored by Levitt and Snyder (1997).
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Examples of voluntary goods are swimming halls, sports venues, but also hospitals. Munic-
ipalities are not required to provide these goods, but may choose to do so if they have the
necessary fiscal resources.
Municipalities fund their expenditures through user fees, municipal taxes, and transfers.
User fees are supposed to cover the cost of specific services. To fund general expenditures,
municipalities must raise tax revenues or rely on transfers. Among the multitude of municipal
taxes, two carry real fiscal importance: the property tax (Grundsteuer B) and the business
tax (Gewerbesteuer). Municipalities are free to choose the rates for these taxes4. That these
two important taxes are under local control allows municipalities to expand the provision of
both mandatory and voluntary goods according to their own discretion.
The state government pays, in very general terms, two types of transfers to municipalities.
The first type of transfers are rule-based general and special purpose grants. In particular,
every year municipalities receive general purpose transfers (Schlu¨sselzuweisungen) accord-
ing to a pre-specified formula that accounts for their tax capacity (Baskaran, 2012b). In
addition, municipalities receive annual special purpose transfers for the provision of spe-
cific public goods. For example, municipalities receive transfers for providing primary and
secondary schools. Since these transfers are based on pre-specified formulas that omit ideo-
logical variables, it is a reasonable conjecture that the allocation of these general and special
purpose transfers is independent of electoral considerations.5
The second type of transfers are ad-hoc grants (Bedarfszuweisungen) that are paid out
of a special fund (Landesausgleichsstock) set up by the fiscal equalization law and financed
by resources allocated to the fiscal equalization scheme.6 The purpose of these transfers is
4They technically do not choose a rate but rather a tax factor that is multiplied with a federation-
wide base rate. However, the tax factor determines the effective tax rate. Note that from 2003 onwards,
municipalities may not choose less than a minimum tax factor for the business tax throughout the federation.
5However, Litschig (2012) shows with Brazilian data that even formula-based transfer programs can be
subject to political manipulation.
6The Landesausgleichsstock is part of the Hessian fiscal equalization scheme and codified in Art. 28 of
the Hessian Fiscal Equalization Law.
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to offer additional support to municipalities that face “extraordinary” fiscal strains and to
alleviate any “fiscal burdens” due to the implementation of the Hessian fiscal equalization
law and other legal stipulations related to municipal finance.
Details about the conditions under which these bailout transfers will be granted are given in
a publication by the state government called Richtlinien u¨ber die Gewa¨hrung von Zuweisun-
gen aus dem Landesausgleichsstock (guidelines for the provision of transfers from the state
equalization fund).7 The Richtlinien state, in a nutshell, that to obtain a bailout, a munici-
pality has to submit a written request to an administrative body called Regierungspra¨sidium
(regional board). There are three Regierungspra¨sidien in Hesse, each responsible for a certain
number of municipalities. In the administrative hierarchy of Hesse, the Regierungspra¨sidium
is located just below the state tier. It is led by a president who is classified as a political
official (politischer Beamter) and directly appointed by the state government. Typically, he
is a member of one of the parties forming the state government.
The Regierungspra¨sidium assesses whether the request of a municipality for a bailout is
well-founded. If it reaches the conclusion that the request is unfounded, it has the authority
to reject the request at this stage. Otherwise, the request is passed over to the state interior
ministry together with an assessment by the Regierungspra¨sidium. The final determination
on whether to grant a bailout is then made by the interior ministry in consultation with the
state finance ministry.
While the Richtlinien specify general requirements under which bailouts will be granted,
there are no strict and definite criteria. The Richtlinien state, for example, that bailouts will
only be paid if municipalities cannot resolve their budgetary problems on their own and if
the municipality itself is not to blame for these problems. However, they neither state when
exactly a municipality cannot resolve its budgetary problems nor under what conditions a
7Two versions of the Richtlinien existed during the sample period: one published in 1993 and the other
in 2003. Both have essentially the same stipulations.
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municipality should be held responsible for its fiscal problems. Consequently, the decision
of either to grant or to refuse a bailout is effectively a discretionary one that is ultimately
made by a politician: the state interior minister.
Voters should be well aware about whether their municipality has received a bailout in the
recent past. Bailouts are well publicized by the local media and actively discussed by local
politicians. Voters should also know that bailouts are granted discretionarily. Even if voters
are not explicitly aware of the formal arrangements, the terminology used by news outlets
and in press releases by local politicians often insinuates that bailouts are a discretionary
choice of the state government. It is often stated that the state government “grants” a
bailout, that it “reaches out” to a municipality, or alternatively that it “refuses to help”.8
Figure 1 presents a map of Hessian municipalities. Municipalities are classified according
to the number of bailouts they have received during the 1999-2010 period. 382 municipalities
received no bailout during these years. 30 municipalities got between one and four. Nine
municipalities received five or more bailouts.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of bailouts per municipality in more detail.
In subfigure (a), we see that among the 39 municipalities that received at least one bailout
during the 1999-2010 period, fourteen received exactly one. Subfigure (c) shows that the
volume of bailout payments steadily increased until the very end of the sample period. In
1999, total bailout payments were 2.78 million Euros. In 2008, this number had increased








As voters should be aware of both that a bailout has been granted recently and that it
was a discretionary decision by the state government, it is possible that they reward the
ruling parties for past bailouts in the next state or local elections.9 However, bailouts may
carry some costs for the recipient municipalities as well. As in many other institutional
settings where large municipal fiscal imbalances result in increased central supervision (Ho-
pland, 2013), municipalities that receive a bailout in Hesse are in principle required to cut
expenditures and raise tax rates. While the extent to which the state government enforces
such austerity measures is subject to discretion, it is plausible that if they are too strict,
municipal voters will be disinclined to support the state government in subsequent elections.
In any case, bailouts and possible austerity measures come as a package, and the goal of this
paper is to explore the net-effect of this package on electoral outcomes.
State elections are held after the end of a legislative period. The length of a legislative
period used to be four years, but was extended to five years in 2002.10 As all German
States, Hesse has a unicameral parliamentary system at the state level. The electoral rule is
complicated, but its essential feature is that voters ultimately elect political parties according
to a proportional rule. While there are elements of a majoritarian system, the parties receive
seats in the legislature roughly proportional to their state-wide “second-vote” share11. If one
of the parties has more than fifty percent of the seats, it can form a single-party government.
9Geißler (2009) questions whether the Bedarfszuweisungen are bailouts from a legal viewpoint. He argues
that these transfers are not bailouts because the Landesausgleichsstock is technically part of the municipal
equalization scheme. Therefore, the resources out of this fund belong in legal terms to the sphere of mu-
nicipal revenues. Nevertheless, that the state government ultimately decides discretionarily on whether a
municipality is entitled to Bedarfszuweisungen implies that they are bailouts from an economic viewpoint.
10The extension was approved by a popular referendum in 2002. Two arguments were made in favor of
this extension (Hessischer Landtag, 2002). First, as most other German States had a five-year legislative
period, the extension would bring Hesse in line with the rest of the federation. Second, the extension would
give the state government and state parliamentarians more time to govern without being distracted by a
looming election.
11The relevant votes are called second vote because voters can cast two votes in state elections. The
“first-vote” is only marginally important for the allocation of seats.
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If none of the parties have more than fifty percent of the seats, a coalition government has
to be formed.
In the regressions with state election outcomes, I focus on the state elections held in 2003
and 2008. State elections are held early in the year in Hesse (either in January or February).
I therefore define in the state level regressions the relevant legislative periods as starting in
the election year and ending in the year immediately before the next election. That is, the
legislative period after the election in 1999 is defined as lasting from 1999 until 2002. The
next legislative period starts in 2003 and lasts until 2007. I do not consider the legislative
periods before 1999 and after 2008 in the state level regressions.12
Local elections are held at the same time in all municipalities, but at a different date
than the state elections. I focus in this paper on the local elections held in 2001, 2006,
and 2011 (all held in March). In general, all parties that are of relevance at the state
level also participate at the local elections. While there are a number of small parties
and municipality-specific groups that have noticeable success, the large state-level parties
dominate the political landscape at the local level as well.
The electoral law at the local level is very complicated. For example, voters can cast
multiple votes for several party lists but also delete individual candidates from any of the
party lists for which they vote (so called kumulieren and panaschieren). All votes are ag-
gregated and seats in the local council of a municipality are allocated roughly according to
the aggregated vote shares. Hence, there is no standard party vote share at the local level.
12More specifically, I have data on bailouts from 1997-2011. I neglect the bailouts in 1997 and 1998 as the
state government was formed by a SPD-Green Party coalition prior to 1999. I also do not use the bailout
data after 2008 in the state election regressions. In a nutshell, the state election of 2008 resulted in a hung
parliament. The right-wing parties were unable to form a government with majority support in the state
parliament. A left-wing majority was technically possible. However, in its effort to achieve a stable coalition
the SPD leadership in Hesse made some deeply unpopular decisions. Yet, it failed nonetheless to form a
government. New elections where held in 2009 and resulted in a CDU-FDP victory and large losses for
the SPD which were attributed to the behavior of its leadership after the 2008 election. I neglect the 2009
election because of its exceptional nature. After 2009, no new state elections have been held in Hesse as of
yet.
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In any case, the parties should ultimately be concerned with the number of seats they gain
in the local council and not with the number of votes as such. Therefore, if bailouts have
positive electoral consequences at the local level, they should lead to a larger seat share in
the local council for the parties that are in power at the state level.
For most of the 1999-2011 period, there were four politically relevant parties in Hesse:
the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), the CDU (Christlich Demokratische
Union), the Green Party (Bu¨dnis 90 / Die Gru¨nen), and the FDP (Freie Demokratische
Partei). The SPD is a social-democratic party and to the left of the political spectrum. The
CDU is a culturally conservative and economically moderately pro-market oriented. The
Green Party focuses on environmental issues and is considered to be left-wing. The FDP is
culturally liberal and strongly pro-market oriented. It is typically considered to be a right-
wing party. In 2008, a new left-wing party, called Die Linke, emerged as an alternative to
the SPD. The SPD and CDU are often referred to as “big” parties because they typically
receive more than 30% of the votes in state level elections in Germany. Accordingly, the
other parties, in particular the Green Party and the FDP, are usually referred to as “small”
parties.
Two types of state governments governed Hesse during the sample period. In the legislative
period from 1999 to 2002, the government was formed by a CDU-FDP coalition. From 2003
to 2007, a sole CDU government was in power. After a brief hung parliament following the
elections in 2008, which necessitated a caretaker government, new elections in 2009 led once
more to a CDU-FDP coalition. In this paper, I always consider the aggregated vote share
of the CDU and FDP as outcome variable. Treating the CDU-FDP coalition as essentially
one large right-wing party is reasonable since voters who are supporters of either of the two
big parties often vote for the corresponding small party for strategic reasons. For example,
supporters of the CDU sometimes vote for the FDP, the “small” right-wing party, to help
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the FDP to over-come the so called “five-percent hurdle” in state-level elections (note that
at the local level the five-percent hurdle was abolished in Hesse in 2001).
The five-percent hurdle implies that parties will only receive seats in the state legislature
if they have more than five percent of the votes in the whole of Hesse. Therefore, if a CDU
supporter wants to see a large seat share for the right-wing party block (and thereby either
prevent a left-wing government or ensure a right-wing government) and she is uncertain
whether the FDP will over-come the five percent hurdle, she should vote for the FDP as her
vote is more decisive if she does so. Similarly, disenchantment with the CDU might result
in a decline of the vote share of the FDP if many CDU supporters have voted strategically
in the previous election. In short, many voters think in terms of left-wing versus right-wing
party blocks rather than in terms of the individual parties, and this should be reflected by
the definition of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Subfigure (a) in Figure 3 compares the average aggregated vote share of left-wing (SPD and
Green Party) and right-wing (CDU and FDP) parties in the two state elections held in 2003
and 2008. It distinguishes between the average vote shares in municipalities that received at
least one bailout in the previous legislative period and the vote shares in municipalities that
received no bailouts. The figure suggests that municipalities that received bailouts during
the previous legislative favored left-wing relative to right-wing parties in both elections.
However, the development of the vote share from one election to the next is very similar for
both groups of municipalities. Subfigure (b) provides a corresponding figure for the three
local elections held in 2001, 2006, and 2011. At first sight, this subfigure suggests that the
seat share of the left-wing parties in the local council has been higher in bailout than in
no-bailout municipalities in every local election. However, the development over time in the
seat shares appears to be once again similar for both types of municipalities.
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3 Empirical methodology
My aim is to study whether a bailout of a municipality in legislative period t − 1 carries
electoral benefits for Hessian state governments in the election at the beginning of the next
legislative period. This question can be analyzed in a standard regression framework by
estimating the following model:
∆vi,t = αEb,Earlyi,t−1 + αLb,Latei,t−1 + βx+ µt + ǫi,t, (1)
where ∆vi,t = vi,t − vi,t−1 is either the change in the share of aggregated votes between two
state elections or the change in the share of aggregated seats between two local elections for
the right-wing parties (CDU and FDP) in a municipality i. ǫi,t is the error term. µt are
legislative fixed effects and x is a vector of appropriately defined control variables.
b,Earlyi,t−1 captures whether a municipality received at least one bailout in first part of the
previous legislative period (operationalized by a dummy variable) or total bailout transfers
in the first part of the previous legislative period (operationalized by a continuous variable,
deflated to 2005 Euros) divided by mean population size over the entire legislative period.
Correspondingly, b,Latei,t−1 captures bailouts in the second half of the previous legislative
period.
I estimate separate coefficients for bailouts paid in the early and late part of a legislative
period because their electoral consequences might be different.13 Voters might recall bailouts
paid shortly before an election more than bailouts that were paid long ago and vote accord-
ingly. I define as late bailouts all bailouts paid at most two years prior to the next election.
Early bailouts are defined according to the length of the legislative period. If the legislative
period only last four years (i. e. state legislative periods before 2003), then the early period
lasts two years. If the legislative period lasts five years, the early period lasts three years.
13I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.
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The legislative term fixed effects are included to account for state-wide changes in the
government’s popularity. The vector x consists of the average in the previous legislative
period of the following variables: the change in the number of municipal inhabitants, the
share of the population below 6 years, the share of the population between 6 and 14 years,
the share of the population over 65, municipal tax capacity, municipal debt per capita, and
the unemployment rate.
Municipal tax capacity is a measure of the revenue-raising capacity of a municipality. It
is based on (but not identical to) municipal tax revenues.14 Debt per capita is the prevailing
stock of debt of a municipality, divided by municipal inhabitants. Both the tax capacity
measure and debt per capita are deflated to 2005 Euros. The unemployment rate is defined
here as the number of unemployed divided by the number of municipal inhabitants.
Despite the inclusion of control variables, there is, given the kind of observational data
that I use in this paper, the possibility that there remain omitted variables affecting both the
likelihood of bailouts and the vote share of the incumbent state government. However, since
I control for the long-term political affiliation of municipalities by using only the change in
vote shares as dependent variable and legislative term fixed effects, such omitted variables
must vary systematically within municipalities and within legislative periods.
Nonetheless, it is still possible that the central government is more likely to provide bailouts
to municipalities in which it expects a loss in votes at the next election for some unobserved
reason not sufficiently accounted for by the control variables. In this case, the treatment
effect of bailouts might be underestimated. Alternatively, the central government might
provide bailouts to municipalities where it anticipates a large vote gain in the future for
reasons unrelated to bailouts. In this case, the treatment effect might be overestimated.
14The tax capacity is a measure reported in the Hessian Municipal Statistics Yearbook. It is constructed
by multiplying the various tax bases with the average of the relevant tax rates prevailing in the state in
a given year. This measure is supposed to reflect the ability of municipalities to raise tax revenues. It is
therefore a more accurate indicator of tax capacity than tax revenues.
15
While it is possible that such unobserved time-varying variables exist, it is unlikely that
they will systematically influence the state government’s bailout policy. Given the inherent
uncertainty about how voters within individual municipalities are going to change their
voting patters from one to the next election, it is implausible that the state government
would base its bailout policy on such expected changes. Consequently, it seems reasonable




In this section, I report the results for state-level elections. I collect separate estimation
results for models with and without control variables. Hypothesis tests are always conducted
with heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors (reported in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates in the regression tables). Clustered standard errors are included to
account for autocorrelation, the unit of clustering hence is the municipality.
The results in Table 1 indicate that bailouts have no electoral consequences for the gov-
erning parties in the state election, irrespective of whether they are paid early or late in the
previous legislative period. The effect is always statistically insignificant. More importantly,
however, the estimates are also very small in economic terms. Ignoring the statistical in-
significance for the moment, I find that the change in the vote share of the governing parties
in municipalities that received a bailout in the late part of the previous legislative period
is at most 0.22 percentage points higher than in municipalities without any bailouts in the
second part of the previous legislative period. For bailouts in the early part of the previous
legislative period, the estimated coefficient is not even positive.
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The second column in each set of models studies the effect of the total volume of bailout
payments, scaled by mean population size. The results show that an additional 100 Euros
per capita in bailout transfers in the second half of the previous legislative increases the vote
share by at most 0.19 percentage points. Once more, the estimated coefficient is not even
positive for bailouts in the first half of the previous legislative period.
As indicated by the relatively small standard errors, the bailout effects are precisely es-
timated. The 95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients cover less than 1.5
percentage point around 0. It thus appears that bailouts have no beneficial consequences for
the incumbent parties in the next state election.
4.2 Local council elections
The previous results show that bailouts carry in subsequent state elections no electoral
benefits for the right-wing parties. However, state elections are not the only type of elections
held in Hesse. The municipal council in each municipality is elected in regular local elections
and it is possible that voters reward the local party branches rather than the state government
as such for bailouts.
In the following, I check whether bailouts indeed increase the seat share of the right-
wing parties. I consider the local elections held in 2001, 2006, and 2011. Similar to the
regressions with the electoral outcomes at the state level, I relate bailouts in the legislative
period immediately predating a particular election with the change in the aggregated share
of seats gained by the CDU and the FDP. Given the timing of the local elections, there are
three instead of only two legislative periods available for these regressions.
Note that since the CDU-FDP coalition assumed power at the state level in 1999, I relate
only the bailouts in 1999 and 2000 to the electoral outcomes in 2001. Voters should attribute
bailouts prior to 1999 to the previous state government formed by the SPD and the Green
Party. Another point to note is that after the state election in 2008 no stable government
17
could be formed (see footnote 12). The previous CDU state government functioned as a
caretaker until new elections could be held in 2009. In this election, a CDU-FDP coalition
was elected. Consequently, it is reasonable to classify the 2008-2010 period as one with a
right-wing state government. In summary, I study whether bailouts between 1999 to 2000
affected the right-wing seat share in the local election of 2001, the bailouts between 2001
to 2005 the right-wing seat share in 2006, and the bailouts between 2006 and 2010 the
right-wing seat share in 2011.
The results are collected in Table 2. Models (I) to (IV) in this table largely mirror
those reported in Table 1. One difference to Models (III) and (IV) of Table 1, however, is
that I additionally include in the list of control variables a dummy that indicates whether
the local council was dominated by right-wing or left-wing parties in the previous legislative
period. More specifically, this dummy variable is 1 if the right-wing seat share in the previous
legislative period was larger than the left-wing seat share, and else 0. This dummy is included
to control for possible incumbency effects on electoral outcomes that could be correlated with
bailouts (Lee, 2008).
Mirroring the findings in the state-level regressions, the results in Models (I) to (IV)
suggest that bailouts paid in the first half of the previous legislative period have no effect on
electoral outcomes at the local level. On the other hand, the results point to a larger effect
of bailouts paid in the second half of the previous legislative period than in the state-level
regressions. The aggregated seat share of the CDU and the FDP in the municipalities that
received a bailout in the second half of previous legislative period increases by about 1.2 to 1.6
percentage points. In addition to being economically larger than in the previous regressions,
the effect is almost statistically significant. Similarly, the models using the volume of bailout
transfers per capita paid in the second half indicate that a rise of 100 Euros per capita in
bailout transfers increases the vote share by about 0.96 to 1.24 percentage points. In these
regressions, the bailout variable is highly significant.
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Hence, bailouts paid in the second half of the previous legislative period have a much
larger effect on the electoral fortune of the ruling party at the local than at the state level.
As indicated in the introduction, there are two explanations for this pattern of results.
First, voters might believe that it is the local politicians of the CDU and FDP who were
instrumental in acquiring a bailout and that, therefore, it is them who should be rewarded.
Alternatively, voters might believe that rewarding the ruling parties in state elections will
have little impact as the voting patterns in any individual municipality are negligible for
state-level electoral outcomes. Therefore, they might opt to reward the ruling parties in
local elections but to focus on other issues when voting in state elections.
One way to indirectly explore the validity of both explanations is through the regressions
reported in Models (V) and (VI) of Table 2. These models include interactions of the bailout
variables with the dummies indicating the ideology of the previous municipal council. More
specifically, I explore whether the effect of a bailout on the vote share of the right-wing
parties depends on whether the local council has been dominated in the previous legislative
period by either right- or left-wing parties.
If voters believe that it is local right-wing politicians that are responsible for securing a
bailout, then the increase in seats of right-wing parties after receiving a bailout should be
larger in municipalities where the council was dominated by right-wing parties in the previous
legislative period. This argument is based on the idea that local right-wing politicians have
more influence with the state government if they originate from a municipality that favors
right-wing parties.
If, on the other hand, voters believe that it is more effective to express their gratitude in
local rather than state elections, the gain in seat share of right-wing parties should be larger
in municipalities where the council is dominated by left-wing parties. The idea underlying
this argument is that an increase in the seat share of right-wing parties matters more if it
can lead to a switch in the ideological alignment of a municipality.
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The results indicate that the gain in seats of right-wing parties in response to a bailout is
smaller in municipalities with right-wing dominance (or, respectively, higher in municipalities
with left-wing dominance). However, the results are somewhat erratic.
For the models with a bailout dummy, the increase in the right-wing seat share in response
to a bailout in the second half of the previous legislative is about 1.97 percentage points lower
in right-wing than in left-wing municipalities. The coefficient is not statistically significant,
however. For bailouts in the first period, there are no meaningful differences for right-wing
and left-wing municipalities in electoral outcomes.
On the other hand, the increase in the right-wing seat share in response to 100 Euros per
capita in bailout transfers in the first half of the previous legislative period is 0.91 percentage
points smaller in municipalities with a right-wing relative majority. This interaction effect
is statistically significant. For bailouts in the second half of the previous legislative period,
there are no differences between right-wing and left-wing municipalities.
The findings for the models with the bailout dummy and the volume of bailouts are thus
to some extent inconsistent. That is, the regression with the bailout dummy suggest the
existence of interaction effects with council ideology for late bailouts while those with the
volume of bailouts suggest significant interactions for early bailouts. The reason for the
erratic nature of the results is presumably that too many parameters have to be estimated
with a limited number of bailouts in these models. For example, there are only five observa-
tions in my sample with both a relative right-wing majority and bailouts in the second half
of a legislative period. Therefore, individual observations can have a large influence on the
coefficient estimates.
Nevertheless, both Model (V) and (VI) suggests that that right-wing governments benefit
from – either early or late – bailouts only in municipalities where the previous council was
dominated by left-wing governments. More specifically, considering that the estimates for the
“base effects” of the bailout variables are 1.36 and 0.97, respectively, the size of the estimates
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for the interaction effects indicate that right-wing parties do not benefit at all from bailouts
in municipalities where right-wing parties were dominant in the previous legislative period.
It appears that the reason why bailouts carry only benefits at the local level is that voters
believe it to be more effective if they reward the right-wing parties in the next municipal
elections. This finding that there are no electoral benefits at the state but some benefits
at the local level has interesting implications for whether the bailout policy of the state
government will be distorted. I discuss these implications in the next section.
5 Conclusion
I ask in this paper whether central governments gain votes by providing bailouts to subna-
tional jurisdictions. Using Hessian municipalities as a natural laboratory, I find that bailouts
carry no meaningful electoral benefits for the ruling parties in state-level elections. On the
other hand, the local politicians from the parties forming the state government seem to be
rewarded by voters.
One reasonable implication of the finding that bailouts carry no benefits for state elections
is that state governments are unlikely to distort their bailout policies in favor of politically
decisive municipalities. While state-level politicians might be concerned about the success
of the local party branches, their careers are ultimately dependent on the outcome of state
elections. If bailouts carry no benefits in these elections, then the most straightforward course
of action for state-level politicians is to grant them according to true fiscal need. Moreover,
only relatively few municipalities receive bailouts in each legislative period. Swaying votes in
these few municipalities might not be worthwhile from the perspective of state governments.
Finally, persistent politically motivated allocations of bailouts may actually result in electoral
losses in municipalities that do not benefit from bailouts.
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The conclusion that political considerations are unlikely to influence the allocation of
bailout transfers contradicts much of the existing literature on the determinants of general
intergovernmental transfers. The consensus in this literature is that political variables mat-
ter. Brollo and Nannicini (2012), for example, find that the Brazilian federal governments
provides more transfers to municipalities with mayors that are politically aligned with the rul-
ing parties at the center. Consequently, some caution regarding the interpretations advanced
in this paper is appropriate. That the parties forming the state government in Hesse benefit
at the local level implies that electoral considerations cannot be fully excluded. To con-
clusively determine that electoral considerations do not bias the state government’s bailout
policy, future research should explore whether and to what extent state-level politicians are
concerned with electoral outcomes at the local level.
Irrespective of the potential explanations for the findings, they neither indicate that
bailouts are efficient nor that politicians do not try to buy votes through transfers. Even if
they do not carry electoral benefits for the central government, the availability of bailouts
is likely to distort local fiscal policy and result in inefficiently high levels of spending and
debt. Similarly, there remains the possibility that politicians use other types of transfers, in
particular regular intergovernmental transfers, to score political gains. A further avenue for
future research, therefore, is to explore in other institutional contexts whether the political
effects of bailout transfers are indeed different from those of regular intergovernmental grants
and to establish the causes for any such differences.
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Table 1: Bailouts and electoral outcomes in state elec-
tions, aggregated vote share of CDU and FDP,
Hessian municipalities.





Value of bailoutst−1,Early -0.068 -0.109
(0.331) (0.293)
Value of bailoutst−1,Late 0.125 0.187
(0.348) (0.352)
∆ Population t−1 -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
∆ Population 6-14 t−1 2.284*** 2.298***
(0.658) (0.659)
∆ Population < 6 t−1 0.408 0.432
(0.908) (0.907)
∆ Population > 65 t−1 1.379*** 1.373***
(0.527) (0.526)
∆ Tax capacityt−1 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
∆ Debt per capita t−1 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
∆ Unemployment ratet−1 0.515 0.506
(0.744) (0.743)
Legislative term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipalities 421 421 419 419
Observations 842 842 838 838
F 2841.885 2842.032 944.066 942.388
a This table presents results for models that relate municipal bailouts in the previous legisla-
tive period to the change in the aggregated vote share of the CDU and FDP in the 2003
and 2008 state elections. The effect of bailouts is allowed to differ according to whether
they were granted early (first two or three years depending on the legislative period) or
late (last two years) in the previous legislative period. The state government was formed
by a coalition between the CDU and the FDP between 1999 and 2002. From 2002 to 2007,
a sole CDU-government was in power.
b Standard errors in parentheses.
c Hypothesis tests are conducted with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Standard
errors are also clustered at the level of the municipality.
d Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
Table 2: Bailouts and electoral outcomes in municipal elections, aggregated seat share of
CDU and FDP in municipal councils, Hessian municipalities.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Bailoutt−1,Early 0.130 0.187 0.376
(1.060) (1.060) (1.424)
Bailoutt−1,Late 1.640 1.189 1.361
(1.230) (1.238) (1.471)
Value of bailoutst−1,Early 0.205 0.299 0.969**
(0.251) (0.247) (0.468)
Value of bailoutst−1,Late 1.235** 0.962* 0.551
(0.510) (0.508) (0.495)
Bailoutt−1,Early× Right-wing rel. majorityt−1 -0.500
(2.031)
Bailoutt−1,Late× Right-wing rel. majorityt−1 -1.965
(3.098)
Value of bailoutst−1,Early× Right-wing rel. majorityt−1 -0.914*
(0.509)
Value of bailoutst−1,Late× Right-wing rel. majorityt−1 0.136
(2.031)
∆ Populationt−1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Population 6-14 t−1 -0.234 -0.139 -0.212 -0.047
(1.291) (1.289) (1.291) (1.290)
∆ Population < 6 t−1 -1.805 -1.687 -1.845 -1.786
(1.614) (1.610) (1.617) (1.615)
∆ Population > 65t−1 -1.465 -1.447 -1.430 -1.421
(0.998) (1.004) (0.998) (1.003)
∆ Tax capacityt−1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Debt per capitat−1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Unemployment ratet−1 -1.261 -1.167 -1.245 -1.149
(0.892) (0.899) (0.892) (0.901)
Right-wing rel. majorityt−1 -1.528*** -1.514*** -1.479*** -1.470***
(0.342) (0.341) (0.343) (0.341)
Legislative term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipalities 421 421 421 421 421 421
Observations 1263 1263 1259 1259 1259 1259
F 138.007 140.263 54.272 54.777 47.526 48.075
a This table presents results for models that relate municipal bailouts in the previous municipal legislative period to the change in the aggregated seat share
of the CDU and the FDP in the municipal council elections of 2001, 2006, and 2011. The effect of bailouts is allowed to differ according to whether they
were granted early (first three years) or late (last two years) in the previous legislative period. The state government was formed by a coalition between the
CDU and the FDP between 1999 and 2002. From 2002 to 2007, a sole CDU-government was in power. From 2008 to 2009, a CDU caretaker government
was in power. From 2009 onwards, the state government was formed by a CDU-FDP coalition.
b Hypothesis tests are conducted with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Standard errors are also clustered at the level of the municipality.







Figure 1: Geographical prevalence of bailouts in Hesse. This figure presents the
total number of bailouts that individual municipalities received during the 1999-2010 period. Five
county-free cities and four forest areas are dropped from the sample. The geocodes for the
administrative boundaries of the Hessian municipalities were obtained from the German Federal
Agency for Cartography and Geodesy.
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Figure 2: Descriptive statistics on bailouts: This figure presents the number and volume of bailouts across municipalities during
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(b) Seat shares in local elections
Figure 3: Vote and seat shares of left-wing and right-wing parties in bailout and no-bailout munic-
ipalities in state and local elections. This figure presents for the state elections held in 2003 and 2008 the average
vote share and for the local elections held in 2001, 2006, and 2011 the average seat share of left-wing (SPD and Green-Party) and
right-wing (CDU and FDP) parties in municipalities that received and in municipalities that did not receive a bailout in the previous
legislative period. The average vote shares for bailout municipalities are indicated with “B” in the figure, the average for no-bailout
municipalities is indicated with “NB”.
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Table A.1: Definition and Source of Variables
Label Description Source
∆ CDU + FDP second vote share First difference of the aggregated second vote share
of the right-wing parties between two state elec-
tions in a given municipality.
Own construction
based on data from
the Hessian State
Statistical Office
∆ CDU + FDP seat share First difference of the aggregated seat share of the
right-wing parties in the local council between two
local elections.
Own construction
based on data from
the Hessian State
Statistical Office
Bailout t−1, Early Dummy variable =1 if at least one bailout in the
early part (either the first two or three years) of
the previous legislative period, 0 else.
Own construction
based on data from the
Hessian State Interior
Ministry
Bailout t−1, Late Dummy variable =1 if at least one bailout in the
late part (last two years) of the previous legislative
period, 0 else.
Own construction
based on data from the
Hessian State Interior
Ministry
Value of bailouts p. c. t−1, Early Sum of total bailout payments in the early part
(either the first two or three years) of the previous
legislative period (deflated by federal CPI) divided
by average population size in the legislative period.
Hessian State Interior
Ministry
Value of bailouts p. c. t−1, Late Sum of total bailout payments in the late part (the
last two years) of the previous legislative period
(deflated by federal CPI) divided by average pop-
ulation size in the legislative period.
Hessian State Interior
Ministry
∆ Population t−1 Average change (first difference) in population size
of municipality in previous legislative period.
Hessian municipal
statistics yearbook
∆ Population< 6 t−1 Average change (first difference) in share of inhab-
itants below 6 years in previous legislative period.
Hessian municipal
statistics yearbook
∆ Population 6-14 t−1 Average change (first difference) in share of inhabi-




∆ Population > 65 t−1 Average change (first difference) in share of inhab-






∆ Tax capacity t−1 Average change (first difference) in real tax ca-
pacity measure (normalized real tax revenues by
capita) in previous legislative period.
Hessian municipal
statistics yearbook
∆ Debt per capita t−1 Average change (first difference) in municipal debt




∆ Unemployment rate t−1 Number of unemployed divided by population size. Federal Employment
Agency (Bundesagen-
tur fu¨r Arbeit)
Right-wing rel. majorityt−1 Dummy variable=1 if seat share of right-wing par-
ties is larger than the seat share of left-wing parties
in the previous legislative period, 0 else.
Own construction
based on data from
the Hessian State
Statistical Office
Table A.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean. Std. Min. Max. Obs.
Regressions with state-level elections
∆ CDU + FDP second vote share overall -0.835 10.453 -21.224 17.735 842
between 1.524 -6.131 4.805 421
within 10.342 -17.581 15.912 2
Bailout t−1, Early overall 0.043 0.202 0.000 1.000 842
between 0.174 0.000 1.000 421
within 0.103 -0.457 0.543 2
Bailout t−1, Late overall 0.040 0.197 0.000 1.000 842
between 0.175 0.000 1.000 421
within 0.091 -0.460 0.540 2
Value of bailouts p. c. t−1, Early overall 0.064 0.379 0.000 4.324 842
between 0.320 0.000 3.177 421
within 0.203 -1.845 1.974 2
Value of bailouts p. c. t−1, Late overall 0.057 0.379 0.000 5.600 842
between 0.298 0.000 2.800 421
within 0.234 -2.743 2.857 2
∆ Population t−1 overall 5.627 71.781 -245.000 445.250 842
between 57.626 -184.625 330.825 421
within 42.845 -267.798 279.052 2
∆ Population < 6 t−1 overall -0.155 0.112 -0.659 0.307 842
between 0.081 -0.493 0.086 421
within 0.076 -0.592 0.283 2
∆ Population 6-14 t−1 overall -0.085 0.156 -0.807 0.659 842
between 0.104 -0.787 0.211 421
within 0.116 -0.807 0.638 2
∆ Population > 65 t−1 overall 0.480 0.180 -0.037 1.234 842
between 0.136 0.045 0.995 421
within 0.119 0.029 0.930 2
∆ Tax capacityt−1 overall 11.737 54.107 -337.056 709.565 842
between 37.178 -124.836 566.072 421
within 39.333 -200.484 223.957 2
∆ Debt per capita t−1 overall 2.518 73.135 -583.738 496.342 838
between 55.608 -309.316 429.178 419
within 47.541 -271.904 276.940 2
∆ Unemployment ratet−1 overall -0.071 0.150 -1.147 0.736 842
between 0.093 -0.564 0.367 421
within 0.118 -0.653 0.512 2
Regressions with local-level elections
∆ CDU + FDP seat share overall 0.522 7.106 -47.826 24.324 1263
between 2.883 -13.043 8.696 421
within 6.496 -34.261 23.945 3
Bailout t−1, Early overall 0.040 0.195 0.000 1.000 1263
between 0.140 0.000 0.667 421
within 0.136 -0.627 0.706 3
Bailout t−1, Late overall 0.033 0.179 0.000 1.000 1263
between 0.140 0.000 1.000 421
within 0.113 -0.633 0.700 3
Value of bailouts p. c. t−1, Early overall 0.072 0.519 0.000 11.682 1263
between 0.360 0.000 5.137 421
within 0.375 -5.065 6.617 3
Value of bailouts p. c. t−1, Late overall 0.050 0.369 0.000 6.615 1263
between 0.279 0.000 3.666 421
within 0.243 -1.966 3.377 3
∆ Population t−1 overall 0.923 75.656 -280.750 761.500 1263
between 56.201 -187.900 394.233 421
within 50.698 -331.110 479.340 3
∆ Population < 6 t−1 overall -0.128 0.115 -0.805 0.495 1263
between 0.064 -0.390 0.111 421
within 0.095 -0.584 0.461 3
∆ Population 6-14 t−1 overall -0.082 0.160 -0.975 0.637 1263
between 0.078 -0.531 0.189 421
within 0.140 -0.869 0.744 3
∆ Population > 65 t−1 overall 0.367 0.215 -0.242 1.534 1263
between 0.115 -0.028 0.809 421
within 0.182 -0.393 1.237 3
∆ Tax capacityt−1 overall 7.552 54.715 -638.703 674.126 1263
between 26.221 -246.163 273.869 421
within 48.034 -384.988 414.492 3
∆ Debt per capita t−1 overall 13.883 82.670 -531.033 709.013 1259
between 50.554 -204.896 321.174 421
within 65.501 -359.031 496.714 2.9905
∆ Unemployment ratet−1 overall -0.190 0.351 -2.155 1.513 1263
between 0.099 -0.812 0.470 421
within 0.337 -1.532 0.854 3
Right-wing rel. majorityt−1 overall 0.333 0.471 0.000 1.000 1263
between 0.419 0.000 1.000 421
within 0.217 -0.334 0.999 3
